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CASENOTES
INCOME TAX: CRANE'S FOOTNOTE 37 REVIVED--Tufts v.
Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court provided the tax shelter' a firm
foundation when it held in Crane v. Commissioner2 that the basis of
property subject to a mortgage for which the owner is not personally
liable, known as a nonrecourse mortgage, is the value of the property
undiminished by the mortgage.' Thus, for little or no cash investment
and with no personal risk, a taxpayer can acquire depreciable, incomeproducing property. He may take depreciation deductions each year to
offset not only the income produced by the property but also income
from other sources.5 However, the taxpayer is not home free. The Su1. A tax shelter is an investment that generates deductions against current income which
may arise either from the shelter itself or from other sources. See, e.g.. Comment, Nonrecourse
Financing and Tax Shelter Abuse: The Crane Doctrine Before and After the At Risk Provisions,
II GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 609, 609 n.1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tax Shelter
Abuse].

2. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. For a discussion of the concept, implications and problems of inclusion of nonrecourse
debt in basis, see MERTENS, 3A LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 21.11 (1977); Perry,
Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX. L. REV. 525
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Perry].

4. 331 U.S. at II.
5. For example, A purchases an apartment building for $170,000.00, putting up $30,000.00
cash and borrowing $140,000.00. Of the purchase price, $20,000.00 is allocated to the land and
$150,000.00 to the building. Under I.R.C. § 167 (1976), A is allowed a depreciation deduction
against the $150,000.00; if she elects to use the straight-line method over a useful life of fifteen
years, the depreciation deduction each year would be $10,000.00 (1/15 of $150,000.00). If the
building generates annual income of $5,000.00, then the deduction offsets that income plus
$5,000.00 of income from other sources. The basis against which the deductions are taken is the
cost of the property, which includes the amount of the mortgage. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allows the taxpayer to take accelerated depreciation over a
fifteen-year period. I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1981). Under this method, for example, the twelve
percent allowed in the first year would yield in this hypothetical a deduction of $18,000.00. (Note
that under I.R.C. § 1250 (1976), the excess of depreciation taken over straight-line would be
recaptured as ordinary income upon disposition of the property).
For discussion of the operation of tax shelters, see Bittker, Tax Shelters. Nonrecourse Debt,
and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bittker]; Cleveland, Foreclosure. Abandonment, and Settlement: The Tax Effects on Mortgagors. 9 TAX ADVISER 68
(1978); Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg];
Perry, supra note 3.
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preme Court in Crane also provided for a recapture of sorts of the depreciation deductions by its holding that when the owner sells the property subject to the mortgage and receives boot,' the amount realized
includes the amount due on the mortgage.7 The Crane Court implied in
footnote 37 that a different result would be reached where the value of
the property sold is less than the amount of the mortgage.' Until recently 9 lower courts have declined to apply footnote 37, however, and,
even where the fair market value of the property sold was less than the
amount of nonrecourse liability secured by the property, have held that
the amount realized includes the mortgage. 10 Breaking rank, though,

6. "Boot" in this context is consideration the seller receives in addition to relief from the
mortgage. See, e.g.. 311 U.S. at 14: "[W]e think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the
debt, who sells the property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a
benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the boot."
7. Id. That the amount realized by the seller includes the amount of the liability where the
buyer assumes the seller's liability (as opposed to acquiring the property subject to the mortgage)
was settled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976) defines amount realized as "the sum of any money received plus the
fair market value of the property (other than money) received." I.R.C. § 1001 (a) (1976) provides
that the taxpayer realizes a gain on the sale or other disposition of the property to the extent that
the amount realized exceeds the adjusted basis. I.R.C. § 1011 (1976) defines adjusted basis as the
cost (as determined by I.R.C. § 1012 (1976)) minus adjustments made in accordance with I.R.C.
§ 1016 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Since those adjustments include the amount of allowable depreciation deduction (i.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1976)), the depreciation deductions are recaptured in the
form of gain when the taxpayer sells the property. One of the pleasant features of tax shelters is
that while the depreciation deductions are taken against ordinary income, if the property is a §
1221 capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer, the gain from the sale of the property is taxed at
capital gains rates. See Comment, Tax Shelter Abuse, supra note 1, at 609 n. 1.
8. Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a
mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.
331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
The Court simply assumed that because Mrs. Crane received boot the fair market value of
the property exceeded the amount of the liability. However, it is questionable that the receipt of
boot is "conclusive evidence that the value of the property exceeded the amount of the obligation
.... [T~he purchaser could have viewed the transaction as the purchase of an option to acquire
should the property increase in value or as an opportunity to collect the rents until foreclosure."
Perry, supra note 3, at 329 n.13. The purchaser could also have wished to pay $3000.00 for the
opportunity to take sizeable depreciation deductions against his income from other sources. See
supra note I.
9. See infra notes 1I & 12 and accompanying text.
10. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978)
(taxpayers surrendered stock in satisfaction of debt secured by the stock); Estate of Delman v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979) (electronic equipment purchased subject to nonrecourse debt
repossessed by seller). See also Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950) (even though
taxpayer claimed amount due exceeded fair market value, court held that the fair market value
was the amount due); Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649 (1951), affd, 198
F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952) (amount realized not limited by fair market value where mortgagor
obtained cash through refinancing); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (on
foreclosure, taxpayer realized gain to extent cash proceeds of refinancing exceeded adjusted basis).
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied footnote 37 and held in
Tufts v. Commissioner" that the fair market value limits the extent to
which the nonrecourse debt can be included in the amount realized."
The significance of this holding, which is a boon to the tax shelter industry,18 is that to the extent that the amount still due on the mortgage
at the time of the sale exceeds the fair market value of the property, no
recapture of depreciation deductions occurs. 4
This note examines the Crane rationale and analyzes the Tufts
decision in relation to the clear trend of courts and the stance of the
Internal Revenue Service in declining to apply footnote 37.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

John Tufts was a partner in a general partnership formed to build
an apartment complex. To finance construction, the partnership borrowed $1.8 million and gave a mortgage note providing that neither the
partnership nor the partners were to be held personally liable. Two
years later, when the principal amount due on the note was still $1.8
million, each partner sold his partnership interest and his interest in the
property owned by the partnership to a third party. The purchaser acquired the property subject to the nonrecourse mortgage. He paid no
consideration other than agreeing to pay the partnership's selling expenses up to $250.00.11
By including the full amount of the nonrecourse mortgage in the
amount realized, the Commissioner determined that each partner had
realized a gain on the sale. The partners argued that the market value

651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted. 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
Id. at 1063. See 9 EST. PLAN. 39 (1982); 55 J. TAX'N 198 (1981).
13. See Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
575, 593-97 (1981).
14. To give an extreme example: B buys rental property subject to a mortgage of
$80,000.00 and pays $20,000.00 cash. For five years, B pays interest only and thus does not reduce the principle amount of the note. Over the five years, he takes a total of $33,000.00 in
depreciation deductions. The neighborhood declines and the fair market value of the property falls
to $50,000.00. He transfers the property, still subject to the $80,000.00 mortgage, to a buyer who
in consideration pays only the attorney and recording fees. Before Tufts, the figures would have
been as follows:
Amount realized
$80,000.00
-67,000.00
Adjusted Basis
$13,000.00
Gain realized
Thus, the depreciation deductions would have been recaptured to the extent of the $13,000.00
gain realized. But under the Tufts holding, there would be no gain:
$50,000.00
Amount realized
-67,000.00
Adjusted basis
($17,000.00)
Gain realized
Under Tufts, none of the depreciation is recaptured, because B has realized no gain.
15. 651 F.2d at 1059.
11.

12.
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should limit the extent to which nonrecourse liability is included in the
amount realized. 16 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner. 17 The circuit court reversed, holding that the amount realized includes nonrecourse liabilities only to the extent of the fair market value of the property securing the indebtedness."
In reaching its conclusion, the Tufts court examined the rationale
of the Crane decision. In Crane, the Supreme Court advanced two theories to justify including the nonrecourse liability in the amount real-

16. Id. Under the theory the partners advanced, they had actually sustained a loss on the
sale of the property. As a result of the deductions they had taken for depreciation and losses, their
aggregate adjusted basis was $1.45 million, or $500,000.00 more than the fair market value of
$1.4 million, which they claimed should also be the amount realized. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 756, 760-61 (1978), revd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. 70 T.C. 756. The taxpayers also argued in the alternative to the footnote 37 argument
that since what they sold was a partnership interest, I.R.C. § 752 (1976) limited their amount
realized to the fair market value. Section 752 provides as follows:
(a) INCREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIE.-Any increase in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of
the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the partnership.
(b) DECREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIEs.-Any decrease in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of
the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a
distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
(c) LIABILITY TO WHICH PROPERTY IS SUBJECT.-For purposes of this section, a liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such
property, be considered as a liability of the owner of the property.
(d) SALE OR EXCHANGE OF AN INTEREST.-In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in
connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.
The partners contended that the fair market limitation of subsection (c) also applies to the sale of
a partnership interest under subsection (d). 70 T.C. at 766. The Tax Court said that although the
§ 752(c) language is broad enough in itself to apply to a sale of a partnership interest, such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with the language of § 752(d) requiring that in the case of
such a sale, "liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the
sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships." Id. at 768. The Tax Court, citing
Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978), and Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), said it is well settled that the amount realized on sale or
exchange of property subject to liability includes the full amount of the liability, even where this
amount exceeds the value of the property. 70 T.C. at 768. The Tax Court concluded that subsection (c) was intended to apply only with respect to the contribution by or distribution to partners
of encumbered property and that subsection (d) was intended to apply to the sale or exchange of
partnership without regard to the fair market value limitation of subsection (c). Id. at 769. Since
the circuit court's holding that fair market value limits amount realized eliminated any conflict
between subsections (c) and (d), the court was not required to rule on the Tax Court's interpretation. However, the circuit court commented in a footnote that "since § 752 is generally regarded
to be an intended codification of the Crane doctrine . . . it seems that our holding is consistent
with congressional understanding of the Crane case." 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8 (citing Perry, supra
note 3, at 542).
18. 631 F.2d at 1063.
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ized on a sale subject to the mortgage. 1 ' The first, referred to by commentators as the economic benefit theory,' 0 states that the property
owner must treat the mortgage liability as if it were his personal obligation. If the taxpayer then transfers the property subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real as if the buyer had assumed the
mortgage or the mortgage had been discharged."1 The second, which
has been called the tax benefit theory,22 declares that once the taxpayer
has been allowed to take depreciation deductions on a basis that includes the nonrecourse liability, the taxpayer is not entitled to the
double deduction that would follow if he were not required to include
the remaining liability in the amount realized."3 The Tufts court rejected both theories; the former as incorrect' 4 and the latter as not the
ground for the Crane decision 5 and as not comporting with congres-

19. 331 U.S. at 14-16.
20. For use of the term "economic benefit theory," see, Bittker, supra note 5, at 285 n.14;
Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in
Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 85 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Del Cotto]; Comment, Non-Recourse Liabilities:A Tax Shelter. 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 57, 74 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Non-Recourse Liabilities]. One commentator has referred to this theory simply as the "forgiveness of indebtedness theory." Comment, Millar: Requiem for Crane's Footnote
37? 41 U. PrT. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Requiem].
21. 331 U.S. at 14.
22. See Del Cotto, supra note 20, at 85. The second Crane rationale has also been referred
to as the balancing entry theory by Bittker, supra note 5, at 284 n.14, and as the double deduction
theory, Comment, Requiem, supra note 20, at 348-49.
23. 331 U.S. at 15-16. For suggestions that the Crane tax benefit theory would have been
more logical had the conclusion been that the taxpayer's gain realized must be measured by the
amount of deductions she has been allowed to take on the unassumed mortgage, see Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21
TAx L. REv. 159, 169-71 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Adams]; Del Cotto, supra note 20, at 10102; Gallagher, Fiscal Alchemy and the Crane Rule: Alternative Solutions to the Tax Shelter. 8
CONN. L. REV. 607, 632 n.l 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gallagher].
24. 651 F.2d at 1062. The court quoted Bittker, supra note S.
The [Crane] Court was, of course, right in asserting that the owner of mortgaged property
must keep up the payments if he wants to retain the property and that for this period of
time, he must treat the debt as a personal obligation whether he is personally liable or not.
It does not follow, however, that the benefit to him from transferring the property subject
to the mortgage is the same in both cases. If you crave gourmet meals, you must pay for
them so long as your addiction continues; but once you break the habit, you need pay only
for those you bought on credit in the past, not for those that you will skip in the future. So
it is with mortgages. Nonrecourse obligations can be disregarded as soon as the property is
sold, given away, or abandoned; personal liability persists even after the property has been
disposed of, whether the new owner assumes or takes subject to the debt.
Id. at 281 (emphasis in original).
Courts faced with footnote 37 situations have tended to focus on the tax benefit theory rather than
the economic benefit theory. See infra text accompanying notes 62-75.
25. 651 F.2d at 1060. But see Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 765-66 (1978), rev'd,
651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 659-70 (1977), aff'd in part,
577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978). The Tax Court in both cases viewed the prevention of double deductions as the rationale for the Crane holding. In Tufts, the Tax Court said:
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sional intent. 6
The Tufts court said that the Supreme Court advanced the double
deduction theory only in response to Mrs. Crane's alternative argument
that she was being taxed on what was not income within the meaning
of the sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 Because the Supreme Court had already concluded that the Commissioner had correctly included the principal amount of the mortgage in
the amount realized before it invoked the specter of double deduction,
the Tufts court viewed the Supreme Court's concern as a response to
the constitutional argument and not as the principal justification for its
holding.'
The Tufts court found that an even more compelling reason to
reject the double deduction rationale is that Congress has already accounted for the previous deductions." Section 1001(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that adjusted basis is subtracted from the
amount realized to determine the gain from the sale or other disposition of property." Section 1016(a) provides that allowable depreciation
deductions are subtracted from cost in arriving at the adjusted basis.8 '
Thus, the court reasoned, the adjustments to basis have factored into
the gain equation any tax benefits the taxpayer may have received. 8
To include the mortgage in the amount realized because of the depreci-

If note 37 were read to provide an exception when the value of the property is less than the
liability, the result would be totally inconsistent with the rationale for the holding of the
Court, that is, since the total liability has been taken into consideration in determining
other tax consequences of the transaction, the total liability must also be included in the
amount realized when the property is transferred.
70 T.C. at 766 (citing Millar, 577 F.2d at 215). In affirming Millar. the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that preventing double deductions was "the principal reasoning of the Supreme
Court in reaching its determination [that amount realized includes the principal amount of the
mortgage]." 577 F.2d at 215. See Friedland, Tufts and Millar; Two New Views of the Crane Case
and Its Famous Footnote. 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 528 (1982). "Crane is a tax benefit case
and must be viewed as such." Id. See also Adams, supra note 23, at 168-71; Del Cotto, supra
note 20, at 83-86; Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 730-31; infra text accompanying notes 62-75.
26. 651 F.2d at 1061. See infra text accompanying notes 29-35.
27. Id. at 1060. The sixteenth amendment, ratified in 1913, gives Congress "power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
28. 651 F.2d at 1060.
29. Id. at 1061.
30. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
31. Id. § 1016(a).
32. 651 F.2d at 1061. Accord Pietrovito, Tufts v. Commissioner: A Limitation on the Inclusion of Nonrecourse Liabilities in Amount Realized, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 265, 281-82 (1982);
Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1,
10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Newman] (since the possibility that the depreciation deduction
may prove to be unwarranted is accounted for in advance by reduction of basis, the amount realized on depreciable property should be the same as on nondepreciable property without regard to
basis considerations).
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ation deductions would be to tax the taxpayer twice on the same gain."
The congressional purpose in allowing depreciation deductions was to
compensate a property owner for wear and tear that would diminish
the value of the property." Thus, justice does not require that these
deductions be recaptured. 8 ' This reasoning led the court to reject the
notion that the tax benefit theory was one of the legs upon which the
Crane holding stood.
The court then examined the economic benefit theory. The court
found the theory was too weak to support an expansion of the concept
of amount realized to include the entire amount due on a nonrecourse
mortgage" where this amount exceeded the fair market value.' 7 The
Tufts court said the Supreme Court's theory "that a mortgagor, not
personally liable on the debt, who sells the property subject to the
mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the
amount of the mortgage as well as the boot"" is "seriously flawed.""9
The court said the premise for the economic benefit theory, that the
owner of property subject to a liability that is lower than the market
value "will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were
his personal obligations,' ° makes sense only as long as the owner
wants to keep the property. As soon as he no longer wants the burdens
of ownership, the taxpayer can transfer the property without concern
for whether the transferee can or will make the mortgage payments,

33. 651 F.2d at 1061.
34. Id. at 1061 n.4. One commentator has suggested that the problem with this line of
reasoning is that it does not provide any rationale for including the entire amount of the nonrecourse mortgage in the basis in the first place. If the purpose of depreciation deductions is to
compensate the taxpayer for loss from wear and tear, then the logical treatment would be to limit
the basis to the actual amount of equity the taxpayer has invested in the property, i.e., the amount
he actually has at risk. This would include both original cash (or cash equivalent) down payment
and payments of principle on the mortgage. The calculations might be somewhat complex because
the equity is constantly increasing as payments on principle are made but certainly not significantly more difficult than amortization or present value calculations. For a discussion of Crane
that suggests this is the formula the Crane Court should have adopted (rather than including the
entire amount of the unassumed mortgage), see Comment, Depreciation of Property Subject to an
Unassumed Mortgage: Implications of the Crane Decision, 26 TEx. L. REV. 796 (1948). See also
Adams, supra note 23, at 174. But see infra note 46.
35. 651 F.2d at 1061 n.4.
36. Id. at 1062-63. The reasoning of the Tufts court rests in part on the belief that inclusion
of the outstanding nonrecourse debt in the amount realized somehow expands amount realized
beyond a norm. This belief, it has been argued, is incorrect. Newman, supra note 32, at 20-21.
The normal measure of amount realized includes nonrecourse debt. The fair market value limitation implied by footnote 37 is the deviation from the norm. Id.
37. 651 F.2d at 1063.
38. 331 U.S. at 14.
39. 651 F.2d at 1062.
40. 331 U.S. at 14.
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with the assurance that his own assets will never be threatened.'

The

court conceded that Mrs. Crane received some benefit in that a purchaser's paying off the mortgage or taking the property subject to the
mortgage was a precondition to her receiving her $2500.00 boot. The
court expressed doubt, however, that the benefit she received was accurately measured by the full amount of the nonrecourse debt.'"

Having thus denied the significance of the two rationales set forth
by Crane, the Tufts court declined to extend the Crane decision beyond
the facts of that case and, without further explanation, applied footnote
37. The court succinctly concluded that "[t]he fair market value limitation so '[o]bviously' anticipated by footnote 37 is warranted. We hold
that the fair market value of the property securing a nonrecourse debt
limits the extent to which the debt can be included in the amount real3
ized on disposition of the property."'1
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Footnote 37: From Crane to Tufts

To obtain a perspective on the departure from a well-worn legal
path made by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tufts, it is important to look at the development of the tax treatment of the disposition
of property subject to nonrecourse mortgages, beginning with the
landmark case of Crane v. Commissioner." Mrs. Crane inherited an
apartment building subject to a mortgage of $255,000.00 and interest
in default of $7042.50. The value of the building appraised for federal
estate tax purposes was equal to the mortgage and the interest. Six
year later, she sold the property subject to the mortgage, received boot
of $3000.00 cash, and paid $500.00 selling expenses. She reported a
taxable gain of $1250.00, on the theory that the only property she ever
owned was the equity, i.e., the amount by which the value of the building and land exceeded the mortgage. When she inherited the property,
her equity was zero. When she sold her equity, her gain realized was
$2500.00, which was the net cash received minus the zero basis." The
41. 651 F.2d at 1062. The court was impressed with the logic of Professor Bittker's analysis
of the economic benefit theory and his characterization of it as "wholly fallacious." Id. at 1062 n.7
(quoting Bittker, supra note 5, at 285 n. 14). The court quoted Professor Bittker's analogy between
the owner of property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage and a gourmet. 651 F.2d at 1062 n.7.
See supra note 24. For the view that Bittker's analysis is flawed, see Newman, supra note 32, at
12. The author suggests that Bittker, as well as the Crane Court, failed to recognize that the
mortgagor receives benefit not only at the time she transfers the property subject to the liability
but also throughout the time she owns and uses the property.
42. 651 F.2d at 1063.
43. Id. "Obviously" is the first word of footnote 37 of Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
44. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
45. Id. at 3-4. As the Court and numerous commentators pointed out, Mrs. Crane's claim
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Court, however, agreed with the Commissioner that the basis when
Mrs. Crane received the property was the value of the property undiminished by the amount of the mortgage, or $262,042.50."
Having decided that the basis included the mortgage because
"property" includes the land and building, not just the taxpayer's equity,4 7 the Court was left with no other option but to conclude that
what Mrs. Crane sold was not merely her equity. "If the 'property' to
be valued on the date of acquisition is the property free of liens, the
'property' to be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing."'
It would be absurd to say that Mrs. Crane sold a quarter-of-a-million
dollar piece of property for $2500.00, only one percent of its value. The
Court avoided this absurdity by concluding that the amount realized on
the sale includes the amount of the mortgage. 4 '
The Court could have ended its analysis at that point."o Instead, it
went on to assert that Mrs. Crane realized an economic benefit equal to
the amount of the mortgage"1 and that the sixteenth amendment does
not require that she be permitted to exclude allowable deductions in
that the basis was zero was inconsistent with her having taken depreciation deductions on a basis
that included the mortgage amount. Id. at 3 n.2. See, e.g., Bittker,.supra note 5, at 279 n.7.
46. 331 U.S. at I1. The Court based this holding on four reasons. First, it consulted the
dictionary and found that the common, everyday meaning of "property" is the physical thing
owned or the aggregate of the owner's rights in the thing and that "equity" is not a synonym of
"property." Second, the administrative construction of the statute governing the basis of property
acquired from a decedent (the antecedent of I.R.C. § 1014(b) (1976)) was in accord, stating that
the value of property as of the date of death is its fair market value. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-3
(1957). Third, an examination of the Internal Revenue Code revealed that the words "property"
and "equity" were not confused and that each was used throughout in its proper sense. Fourth, if
the basis of the property were limited to the owner's equity, the allowable depreciation deductions
would represent only a fraction of the actual wear and tear; furthermore, using equity as basis
would create a tremendous accounting burden on the taxpayer and the I.R.S. because the basis
would have to be refigured with each payment on the mortgage. 331 U.S. at 6-10. See Adams,
supra note 23, at 163.
47. 331 U.S. at 6-11.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 13. Had Mrs. Crane been personally liable on the mortgage and had the purchaser assumed or paid the mortgage, the mortgage amount would undisputably have been part of
the amount realized. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938) (assumption and payment by a transferee of transferor's liability constitutes boot). Of course, the Supreme Court could
have concluded that what the buyer actually purchased for $3000.00 was the right to take depreciation deductions on a basis of $253,000.00 (the mortgage amount plus the-boot).
50. See Adams, supra note 23.
It would have been better had we stopped there. We attempted to reinforce our position, however, by arguing that Mrs. Crane had actually received a benefit "in the amount
of the mortgage as well as the boot". Our theory was that the payment of boot was conclusive proof that the property was worth more than the boot, and that where this is so the
mortgagor has no alternative other than to protect his equity by treating the conditions of
the mortgage as if they were his personal obligations. On both counts we were sadly misled.
Id. at 175.
51. 331 U.S. at 14. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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computing gain." These two theories are compatible where the fair
market value of the property exceeds the amount due on the mortgage.
But the Court recognized in footnote 37 that when the fair market
value of the property at the time of disposition is less than the amount
due on the mortgage, "a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot
realize a benefit equal to the mortgage.""' Thus, faced with a situation
in which both the mortgage amounts exceeds the fair market value and
the mortgagor receives no boot when he disposes of the property, a
court cannot logically apply both Crane theories. The economic benefit
theory and footnote 37 require that the amount realized be limited by
the fair market value." On the other hand, the tax benefit theory maintains that if the mortgage was included in the basis for the purpose of
calculating depreciation deductions, it must be included in full in the
amount realized."
In cases that have followed Crane, its application has been
straightforward where there has been no contention that the property
disposed of subject to a nonrecourse mortgage was worth less than the
amount due.' 6 Under either the tax benefit theory or the economic ben52. Id. at 15-16. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
53. Id. at 14 n.37.
54. Since the only security for the mortgage is the property itself, the amount the mortgagor stands to lose in the event of foreclosure is limited by the fair market value of the property.
Thus, when the mortgagor disposes of the property subject to the mortgage, the economic benefit
he receives from being relieved of that risk can be no greater than the value of the property.
To the extent that the amount of the mortgage exceeds the value of the property, no property of a mortgagor not personally liable could be used to satisfy the mortgage. Thus the
taxpayer would get no 'benefit" to this extent from disposition of the property subject to
the mortgage. If the"economic benefit" theory is to be applied consistently, no gain is realized in this amount.
Del Cotto, supra note 20, at 85.
But see Newman, supra note 32, at 12-13. The Crane Court's economic benefit theory rested on
the assumption that transfer of property subject to a mortgage is the equivalent of a cash sale.
This view is too narrow, Mr. Newman suggests, because it fails to recognize the up-front benefit
of present enjoyment of the property by the mortgagor. The actual economic benefit includes the
present use; the mortgage obligation reflects the duty to pay for what is already being enjoyed. Id.
55. See Del Cotto, supra note 20.
This is the dilemma of Crane. Consistent application of a theory of "economic benefit"
limits the amount of the mortgage that is realized, while the other discernible rationale of
Crane-based on a theory of "tax benefit"-requires inclusion in amount realized of the
full amount of the mortgage irrespective of the property's value.
Id. at 85.
See also Adams, supra note 23, at 169; Bittker, supra note 5, at 285 n.14.; Comment, NonRecourse Liabilities, supra note 20, at 75; Comment, Requiem, supra note 20, at 349.
56. See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1965) (where property
sold subject to mortgage and payment made by purchaser later treated by parties as overcharge
and required to be repaid, amount realized includes the mortgage debt), R. O'Dell & Sons Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1165 (1947) (taxpayer realized taxable gain on judicial sale of
taxpayer's real property as a result of foreclosure of mortgage thereon; amount realized includes
entire amount of mortgage).
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efit theory, the amount realized correctly includes the liability. Where

the taxpayer has asserted, however, that the fair market value of the
property is less than the amount due on the mortgage, courts have had
to wrestle with the Crane dilemma. In Parker v. Delaney,"7 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals solved the dilemma by sidestepping footnote
37. The taxpayer acquired property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage
and used the mortgage amount as the basis for calculating depreciation
deductions. After partially amortizing the debt, he conveyed the property to the mortgagee, receiving no boot. Even though the taxpayer
contended that footnote 37 applied because the amount due exceeded
the value of the property, the circuit court avoided footnote 37 by accepting the district court's treatment of fair market value as equaling
the amount due. The lien at the time the property was acquired was
the cost of the property "and so must be treated as value at the later
time [when returning the property to the mortgagee]."" The footnote
37 dictum was likewise avoided in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner.51 In Woodsam, the taxpayer-corporation received property
from a controlling shareholder who had mortgaged the property to obtain cash. When the mortgage was foreclosed, the corporation argued
that because the fair market value was lower than the amount due on
the mortgage, application of footnote 37 should limit the amount realized to the fair market value.10 The Tax Court held the fair market
value irrelevant where the taxpayer (or, in this case, the controlling
shareholder) previously obtained cash in return for the mortgage because the taxpayer clearly realized an economic gain equal to the excess of the amount due on the mortgage over the adjusted basis of the
property.61
In three recent cases, the Tax Court has squarely faced the Crane
dilemma and has chosen to apply the tax benefit rationale of Crane,
holding that the entire balance of nonrecourse liability is included in
the amount realized even though the liability exceeds the fair market
value." In Estate of Delman v. Commissioner," electronic equipment

57. 186 F.2d 455 (Ist Cir. 1950).
58. Id. at 458-59.
59. 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd., 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
60. 16 T.C. at 654-55.
61. Id. at 655. The Tax Court distinguished Crane and relied on a pre-Crane case, Lutz &
Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 682 (1943), in which the taxpayer had placed the mortgage on the property and enjoyed the proceeds before the mortgage was foreclosed. Cf Mendham
Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (on foreclosure, taxpayer realized gain to extent cash
proceeds of refinancing exceeded adjusted basis).
62. Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
756 (1978), rev'd.. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977),
affd in pertinent part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
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purchased by a partnership subject to nonrecourse financing was repossessed by the seller. At the time of repossession, the amount due on the
sales contract was more than $1 million, whereas the fair market value
of the equipment was only $400,000.00." The partners had included
the liability in the basis of the property and had taken depreciation
deductions with respect to the property. These deductions led to losses
for income tax purposes and each partner realized a tax benefit to the
extent of his distributive share of the losses." "Under these circumstances," the Tax Court said, "the principles of Crane

. .

.apply, and

the entire balance of the nonrecourse liability is included in the amount
realized . . .notwithstanding the fact that the liability exceeded the

fair market value of the property repossessed.""
In two previous cases, Millar v. Commissioner s7 and Tufts v.
Commissioner," the Tax Court used the same logic. In Millar, the
taxpayers received a loan which was secured by their stock in Grant
County Coal Company, a Subchapter S corporation. The corporation's
net operating losses were passed onto the stockholders, who received a
tax benefit by deducting the losses on their federal income tax returns.
The lender foreclosed on the notes (the taxpayers had made no payments on the loan) and the taxpayers surrendered the stock. The Tax
Court held that the taxpayers realized taxable gain when they surrendered their stock in complete satisfaction of the foreclosed note because
the amount realized included the amount of outstanding liability. e
Similarly, in its decision in Tufts,"0 the Tax Court emphasized the tax
benefit rationale:
If note 37 were read to provide an exception when the value of the property is less than the liability, the result would be totally inconsistent with
the rationale for the holding of the [Crane] Court, that is, since the total
liability has been taken into consideration in determining other tax con-

sequences of the transaction, the total liability must also be included in

970 (1980). The issue in Freeland was whether the reconveyance to the mortgagee of property
subject to a purchase-money nonrecourse mortgage constituted a sale. In holding that the reconveyance was a sale, the Tax Court reasoned that relief from indebtedness is sufficient consideration to support a sale or exchange. Id. at 981. The court said in dictum that even though the
liability exceeds the value of the property, the full amount of the nonrecourse liability is included
in the amount realized. Id. at 979. For discussion of the Freeland case, see Comment, Crane's
Footnote Thirty-seven Gets the Boot, II SETON HALL L. REV. 679 (1981).
63. 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
64. Id. at 27-28.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Id.
67. 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd in pertinent part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978).
68. 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. 67 T.C. at 660.
70. 70 T.C. 756.
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the amount realized when the property is transferred."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court's
reading of the Crane tax benefit rationale, affirming Millar on the issue
of including the entire liability in the amount realized. 7 ' The appellate
court said the finding that the amount realized by the taxpayers on
exchanging their stock for the cancellation of their indebtedness included the entire amount of the liability "is totally in keeping with the
spirit and reasoning of Crane. '7' The court continued:
While not personally liable on the loan

. . .

the taxpayers utilized those

funds to increase the basis of their stock [by making additional contributions to capital], which then permitted them to claim sizeable deductions
calculated against that basis. .

..

Having substantially reduced the ad-

justed basis of their stock in this manner and thereafter surrendering
their devalued stock in exchange for the cancellation of their indebtedness, the taxpayers clearly realized taxable gain equal to the value of the
cancelled obligation, less the adjusted basis of their surrendered stock. A
finding that the taxpayers did not realize gain as a result of this exchange, after having realized the full economic benefit of this transaction, would entitle them to the type of double deduction of which the
Supreme Court so clearly disapproved in Crane."
The court declined to apply footnote 37 because it was dictum and
merely a postulate with regard to a hypothetical situation not before
the court."'

B. Footnote 37 and the Internal Revenue Service
The Tax Court decisions in Delman, Tufts and Millar, and the
holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Millar, were of course
victories for the Internal Revenue Service. The I.R.S. had been arguing
since before Crane that the amount realized on a sale included the entire amount of the nonrecourse mortgage, regardless of whether the
amount due exceeded the fair market value. 7 The Service solidified its
position against the implications of footnote 37 in a 1976 revenue rul-

71. Id. at 766 (citing Millar, 577 F.2d at 215).
72. 577 F.2d at 212.
73. Id. at 215.
74. Id. Even though the court used the phrase "economic benefit," the subject of its analysis
is in fact tax benefit. The court focused on the deductions the taxpayers took on the basis of the
stock which included the nonrecourse note, indicating that the benefit the court was concerned
with was the tax savings received by the taxpayers as a result of their deductions. Id. at 214-15.
75. Id. at 215.
76. See. e.g., Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 682 (1943) (taxpayer placed
mortgage on property after acquisition; amount realized on returning the property to the mortgagee in satisfaction of the debt was the amount due on the note).
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ing." In that ruling, the taxpayer purchased a herd of cattle, contracting to pay in installments with the herd serving as the only security. After owning the herd for three years and claiming deductions for

depreciation and losses, the taxpayer transferred the herd to the seller
in complete satisfaction of the indebtedness. The I.R.S. ruled,
whatever inference may be drawn from footnote 37 in the Crane case,
the unpaid balance on the sales contracts, which indebtedness was cancelled upon the transfer of the herds . . . is the amount realized by the
taxpayers on such sales, for purposes of determining gain or loss under
section 1001 of the Code, regardless of the fair market value of the herds
at the time of their return to the seller.78

The Treasury Department incorporated this position into a 1980 regulation7 which specified that the amount realized from the sale or other
disposition of property includes the amount of nonrecourse liability
from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale.80 According to the regulation, the fact that the fair market value of the

property at the time of transfer is less than the amount of liability does
not prevent the inclusion of the full amount of the liability in the

amount realized. 8 '
C.

Congressional Treatment of Footnote 37 Situations

An examination of Internal Revenue Code (the Code) sections applicable to the sale or exchange of property subject to liabilities does
not yield a consistent congressional policy toward footnote 37 situations. Section 752 of the Code"' provides that in a partnership situation, any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities shall be considered a contribution of money to the partnership by the partner 8 and
likewise, any decrease in the partner's share of the liabilities shall be
considered a distribution of money to such partner." Section 752(c),
however, limits the amount of the liability that will be deemed the personal liability of the owner to the fair market value of the property to
which the liability is attached. 85 The Tufts court commented that since
section 752 is generally regarded as a codification of Crane, the court's
holding that fair market value limits the extent to which nonrecourse

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
Id. at 215.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
Id. § 1.1001-2(a).
Id. § 1.1001-2(b).
I.R.C. § 752 (1976). See supra note 17 for text of § 752.
Id. § 752(a).
Id. § 752(b).
Id. § 752(c).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/7

1982]

CASENOTES

liability is included in amount realized is consistent with the congressional understanding of Crane.86 The same fair market value limitation
is imposed by section 311 (c)8" of the Code on the amount of gain recognized by a corporation as a consequence of its distribution, to a
shareholder, of property subject to a liability.
In contrast with these Code sections are several sections that
clearly include the entire amount of the liability. Section 357(b) 88 provides that when a taxpayer transfers property subject to liability to a
corporation in exchange for stock, and the principal purpose of the
transaction is tax avoidance, the entire amount of the liability shall be
considered as money received by the taxpayer. Since section 351(b) 89
requires the recognition of gain in such an exchange to the extent of
money received by the taxpayer, application of section 357(b) means
that the entire amount of the liability is included in the taxpayer's
amount realized. Likewise, section 1031(d), 9* which governs the basis
of property acquired in a like-kind exchange, specifies that the entire
amount of liability to which exchanged property is subject shall be considered as money. As in the case of a section 351 transfer, treatment of
the liability as money means that the entire amount of the liability will
be included in the amount realized. 91
Consequently, the Tufts holding appears to harmonize with congressional treatment of nonrecourse liabilities in the context of partners' shares of partnership liabilities and corporate distributions; however, it is inconsistent with the Code's handling of transfers of property
in corporate organizations and like-kind exchanges.
D. Implications of the Tufts Holding
The Tufts holding that fair market value limits the extent to
which nonrecourse debt can be included in the amount realized on the
disposition of property 92 is a boon to taxpayers who utilize tax shelters.
It means that a taxpayer can finance a purchase of property with a
mortgage, secured only by the property itself, with no personal risk beyond his invested cash or other equity. The taxpayer may also take
deductions against ordinary income for depreciation and losses on a basis that includes the nonrecourse debt, secure in the knowledge that if
86. 651 F.2d at 1063 & n.8 (citing Perry, supra note 3, at 542).
87. I.R.C. § 311(c) (1976).
88. I.R.C. § 357(b) (1976). The section also applies to I.R.C. § 361 (1976), transfers of
property by corporations in reorganization; 1.R.C. § 371 (1976), reorganization in receivership or
bankruptcy; and I.R.C. § 374 (1976), railroad reorganization.
89. I.R.C. § 351(b) (1976).
90. Id.§ 1031(d) (1976).
91. Id.§ 1031(b).
92. 651 F.2d at 1063.
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the fair market value of the property should decline to or below the
adjusted basis, he can dispose of the property without being subject to
recapture of those deductions.'"
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Crane v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that the
amount realized on the sale or exchange of property subject to a nonrecourse liability includes the amount of the liability. In footnote 37, the
Crane Court implied that a different result might follow where the liability exceeded the fair market value of the property. Until Tufts, however, lower courts have declined to apply footnote 37 and have held
instead that the amount realized includes the total liability, even where
it exceeds the value of the property. Although the fair market value
limitation has been mandated by Congress in two distinct Code sections, other Code sections explicitly include the entire amount of the
liability. The regulations and a revenue ruling are in accord with the
majority position that the entire amount of the liability must be included. In spite of this overwhelming opposition to the application of
footnote 37, the court in Tufts v. Commissioner applied footnote 37
and held that fair market value limits the extent to which nonrecourse
debt can be included in the amount realized.
In view of the widespread use of nonrecourse debt and tax shelters,
and because of the conflict between the Fifth and the Third Circuits, it
is not surprising that the Supreme Court has agreed to reexamine the
footnote 37 issue.' Until the Supreme Court rules on Tufts, it seems
unlikely that Congress will follow the suggestion of the Fifth Circuit
that if Congress wishes to legislate recapture, it can do so through redefinition of basis or through limitations on deductions."
Lee A. Kintzel
93. See supra note 5. In the example given in note 5, if the taxpayer had owned the property for five years and had taken a depreciation deduction each year of $10,000.00, the adjusted
basis would be $100,000.00. If the fair market value of the property had declined to $100,000.00,
the amount still due on the mortgage was $115,000.00, and the taxpayer transferred the property
without boot, then under Tufts his gain realized would be zero, without regard to the amount still
due on the mortgage (amount realized of $100,000.00 less adjusted basis of $100,000.00). However, the Millar holding would require recognition of $15,000.00 of gain (amount realized of
$115,000.00 less $100,000.00 adjusted basis). If the property was a capital asset to the taxpayer
in the 50 percent bracket, his tax on the gain under Millar would be $3000.00 (40 percent of
$15,000.00 x 50 percent).
94. The Supreme Court has granted certiorarion Tufts, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
95. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9. The court said:
The real crux of the problem . . . is the taxpayer's ability to manipulate his basis and
adjusted basis through the use of nonrecourse financing. The solution, in our opinion, is to
deal directly with the definitions of "basis" and "adjusted basis," either judicially or
through legislation . . . It is not a solution to distort the definition of amount realized by
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finding an economic benefit equivalent to cash where none exists. There is simply no relationship between basis, adjustments to basis, and amount realized, except where Congress
has specifically legislated for recapture. In response to the notion that it is unfair for a
taxpayer to enjoy the benefit of substantial deductions on property acquired with nonrecourse funds, we need only state that Congress knows how to limit deductions to amounts
that the taxpayer actually places at risk, see, e.g.. I.R.C. § 465 [1976], and has not yet
done so under the circumstances of this case.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did deal directly with the definition of basis when it held in
Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981), that a nonrecourse note in
payment for oil and gas drilling that was contingent on future production could not be included in
basis because the amount of liability exceeded the fair market value of the property securing the
note. An attack on basis by other circuits or by Congress seems unlikely, however, considering the
more than three decades that have elapsed since Crane.

Published by eCommons, 1982

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/7

